Congressional Hearing on Terrorism Financing Focused on Bank Secrecy Act Data Collection and Sharing and Effectiveness
Congressional Hearing on Terrorism Finance Probes Bank Secrecy Act Data Processing Effectiveness, Lack of Beneficial Ownership Transparency, and Potential BSA and Patriot Act Amendments
On April 27, 2017, Hdeel Abdelhady attended a Congressional hearing on “Safeguarding the Financial System from Terrorist Financing,” held by the House Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Financing (the “Subcommittee”). The sole witness was Mr. Jamal El-Hindi, Acting Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury charged with protecting the financial system from money laundering, terrorism financing and other illicit activities.
The hearing’s purposes were to examine the methods and efficacy of FinCEN data collection, processing and information sharing and whether the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and USA PATRIOT Act should be amended to improve FinCEN’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) capacities and performance.
In this brief MassPoint update, Hdeel highlights BSA data collection and usage numbers and some of the questions and issues that appeared to be of particular interest and/or concern to Congress members in attendance, taking into account the nature and frequency of the questions asked, the tone of questions, and related requests for additional or clarifying information from FinCEN.
To deprive SOEs of the tactical advantage of asserting sovereign immunity in U.S. courts, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced on September 14 the State-Owned Entity Transparency and Accountability Reform (STAR) Act of 2016, "a bill to improve the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and for other purposes." Specifically, the STAR Act would remove a level of specificity required to link a specific legal entity to commercial activity by amending the FSIA to make “commercial activity . . . attributable to any corporate affiliate of the agency or instrumentality that (A) directly or indirectly owns a majority of shares . . . and (B) is also an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”
It has been reported that Muhammad Ali’s final resting place is marked with a gravestone that bears only his name. “In keeping with [the] Muslim tradition” of simple funerary practices, “there are no dates or loving tributes.” This is most appropriate, as Muhammad Ali needs no special inscriptions or tributes. The name he chose for himself as a young man is the epitaph that describes him best. “Worthy of all praises, most high.”
The enforcement of OFAC-administered sanctions by a state agency—even against banks by a banking regulator operating in a dual banking system—raises fundamental constitutional and other legal questions. Chief among them is the overarching question of whether U.S. states have authority to directly or effectively enforce OFAC-administered sanctions, particularly independently and prior to enforcement by competent federal authorities—namely OFAC. This question and some of the legal issues and policy and practical considerations appertaining to it are discussed in detail in a forthcoming publication. This document provides a summary preview of some of the key legal issues discussed in that publication. Additional summary previews may be provided separately.
Traditionally businesses have looked to contractual terms, industry groups, legislatures, regulators and other conventional authorities to identify and manage commercial, legal, and compliance requirements and risks. In today’s interconnected, information rich, and reputation-conscious business world, this model is outdated and insufficient. It creates blind spots that can expose businesses to commercial, legal, and compliance risks from sources that traditional models ignore, misunderstand, or underestimate. In the same ways that the internet and social media have enabled non- “establishment” actors to communicate and amplify political messages, these and other tools of the information/new media age have enabled non-traditional actors to effectively influence business conduct standards. As a result, constituencies and issues that not so long ago were marginal or viewed as niche or inconsequential are now relevant, and for some businesses and industries they are integral.
The 2013 sale of American pork producer and processer Smithfield Foods to China’s Shuanghui International aroused concern among some U.S. lawmakers. The $4.7 billion deal ($7.1 billion including debt), was and remains the largest acquisition of a U.S. business by a Chinese entity. This year, some U.S. lawmakers are again raising concerns about a Chinese firm’s acquisition of an agricultural company: the proposed $43 billion acquisition by state-owned China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina) of Syngetna AG , the Swiss agrochemicals company that does substantial business in the United States. If completed, the Syngenta deal would “transform ChemChina into the world’s biggest supplier of pesticides and agrochemicals.”With Chinese buyers, record-setting deals, and industry-leading acquisition targets in the mix, the Smithfield and Syngenta transactions provide the ingredients needed to stir media interest and controversy about foreign investment in and affecting the United States. Beyond deal optics, a more interesting, strategically-oriented, and potentially consequential policy and public discourse about foreign investment in U.S. agriculture is emerging in the United States, at least in some quarters
Specialized Insolvency Regimes for Islamic Banks: Regulatory Prerogative and Process Design Author: Hdeel Abdelhady Original Publication: World Bank Legal Review, Volume 5 Abstract As Islamic banks grow in size and number, they will require enabling legal and regulatory environments to facilitate…
Hdeel Abdelhady proposes a multilateral food security waqf, a type of Islamic trust or endowment, as a vehicle of investment in the future food security of the Middle East. This article focuses on the rationale and objectives of a waqf-based framework currently under development by the author, for application by governments, institutions, and private entities. The structures under development combine the waqf (as a foundational framework to allocate funding and other assets) with Islamic financing structures, Islamic and conventional asset management approaches, Shari’ah- and civil law-based legal frameworks, and effective governance and operational models to achieve measureable impact, in a manner that equitably and rationally distributes rights and responsibilities among parties across the food supply chain, from government consumers to small farmers.
Recent investigations of financial institutions for "corrupt" hiring of foreign officials' family members highlight links between anticorruption and AML compliance and enforcement. Financial institutions dealing with politically exposed persons and state-owned enterprises should leverage AML expertise to bolster anticorruption compliance.
Like some emerging economy countries, some EMEs that have had prior success and are financially strong are, at the enterprise level, in transitional phases. These EMEs:(1) are facing changing global and local economic and operating conditions; (2) have newfound global visibility that invites greater public scrutiny; (3) have strategic, next level goals; and, (4) must navigate established and evolving standards of business conduct that are being set and enforced by diverse external constituencies and growing more material to the bottom line. To adapt to changing conditions and advance their objectives efficiently—i.e., by proactively limiting reputational, commercial, legal and other risks and costs and capitalizing on opportunities that favor well-governed enterprises—these EMEs need not just strong governance, but entrepreneurial governance.
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ood insecurity is a global threat. The nature of food and the means of its production make food insecurity a uniquely complex problem with social, political, economic, and ethical dimensions. Serious efforts to promote food security must respond to the complexities of the challenge. At the national level, Middle Eastern countries have attempted to address food insecurity risks through food subsidies, export bans, price ceilings, and other policy measures. Others, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) states, have sought to bolster food security by acquiring farmland overseas. Acquisitions of overseas farmland and land-use rights by Arab countries and other parties have not been without controversy. The acquisition of agricultural land to produce food exclusively for the benefit of acquirer countries is legally and politically risky. As a region, the Middle East has not explored its potential to sustainably bolster food security by marshaling its combined monetary, natural and human resources for the long-term benefit of its inhabitants. It is in the region’s best interest to identify and pursue strategies to bolster food security, through increased regional production and other means, in ways that are not only economically, legally, and environmentally sustainable, but also are politically, socially, and ethically sound.