The imposition of Global Magnitsky anti-corruption sanctions on two Cambodian related to the Ream Naval Base is strategically significant in the context of U.S. concerns about China's activities and influence in Cambodia.
Hdeel Abdelhady's recent article on the Strategic Competition Act's proposed expansion of CFIUS' jurisdiction to foreign funding of U.S. colleges and universities is available at Law360.
Several pieces of legislation are pending in Congress to more comprehensively shore up the U.S. position in the U.S.-China technology race. The Strategic Competition Act of 2021 illustrates clearly the official U.S. view of academia’s role in the U.S.-China technology race, and the links between U.S. policies and legal measures to regulate foreign access to U.S. science and technology within and across the private, public, and academic sectors.
With the passage of the NDAA for FY 2021, we are reminded that the United States views as an issue of “great power competition” China’s financial and infrastructure diplomacy, particularly China’s lending to developing nations and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Congress provided a reminder of the United States’ concerns as to China’s cross-border lending and the BRI. The massive annual defense spending legislation includes two provisions directly on point.
After the 2016 Presidential election, MassPoint PLLC published five issues to watch in 2017 (and beyond). We revisit our predictions on the five issues, which we expect to remain watch-worthy under the Biden Administration.
We expect that with respect to U.S.-China trade and emerging technologies disputes and competition, the Biden Administration will take a more comprehensive, coordinated, and multilateral approach, relying more on joint action and shared objectives with Congress (where there is bipartisan consensus on key China matters) and U.S. allies, particularly in Europe and Asia. That said, the proximity of the January 11, 2021 operational date will likely require the incoming administration to ensure that any abandonment of or departures from the Executive order are framed in a compelling strategic and policy terms, so as to, at minimum, avoid exposure to claims from some quarters that the next president is “soft on China.”
The United States has targted a Belt& Road project with Global Magnitsky Sanctions. The move is significant, and might signal a ratcheting up of U.S. opposition to the BRI, which has largely comprised rhetoric, diplomatic lobbying, and relatively tepid competition, such as by the establishment of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
The Treasury Department’s announcement of the sanctions speaks to the foreign policy and geostrategic significance of the UDG sanctions action. The release speaks of China’s “malign” investment in Cambodia, its use of the UDG projects in Cambodia to “advance ambitions to project power globally,” “disproportionality benefit” itself through BRI projects, and concerns that the Dara Kakor project “could be converted to “host military assets.” The Treasury Department’s language echoes U.S. concerns about the BRI and other Chinese international project financing activities, including that China engages in “debt trap” financing.
On August 14, President Trump ordered ByteDance to divest its assets and interests in TikTok. What happens if ByteDance does not comply? The question may seem academic, given historical compliance with divestment orders and ByteDance’s talks with U.S. companies about TikTok’s sale. But a recent legal move by China—its expansion of a list of technologies that require government approval for export, including apparently in a sale of TikTok—renders real the issue of non-compliance with the August 14 divestment order, and potentially raises unprecedented issues.
In a two part RegTech podcast, MassPoint's Hdeel Abdelhady talked with Accuity about issues of financial crime, due diligence, and related issues around lawyers as gatekeepers of the financial system.