Global Magnitsky Sanctions “a Central Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy”
United States Lobbies G-7 Nations to Adopt Global Magnitsky Sanctions, Now a “Central Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy” As discussed extensively on this website and at MassPoint…
Decoding Trump on Trade
Other of Mr. Trump’s statements, including dating back decades, hint that he views trade as “unfair” when other nations fail to compensate the United States for providing the secure conditions under which they trade and prosper. In 1987, Citizen Trump took out full page ads in three major newspapers criticizing U.S. “foreign defense policy” for its lack of “backbone.” Why, asked Mr. Trump, were foreign nations like Japan “not paying the United States for the human lives and billions of dollars we are losing to protect their interests?” In a 1988 interview with Oprah Winfrey, Mr. Trump wondered why Kuwait, “where the poorest people live like kings,” was not paying the United States “25 percent of what they’re making” from oil sales when “we make it possible for them to sell their oil.” More recently, to extract trade concessions, the President reminded South Korea of its reliance on the United States for its security.
Trump Administration Supercharged Global Magnitsky Corruption and Human Rights Sanctions
Beyond the parameters of the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13818 markedly enlarges the range of sanctionable conduct and persons. The differences between the language of EO 13818 and the Global Magnitsky Act are substantive and significant. In several instances, EO 13818 expands sanctions by omitting the Act’s qualifying language, adding new bases for sanctions, and/or leaving key terms undefined. Key instances of EO 13818’s broad and/or uncertain language are discussed below.
U.S. Multinationals, Dual Citizens Subject to Global Magnitsky Sanctions
The Global Magnitsky Act defines a “foreign person” as “any citizen or national of a foreign state (including any such individual who is also a citizen or national of the United States), or any entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States or existing solely in the United States.” Accordingly, under the Global Magnitsky Act, individuals who are dual (or more) nationals and companies that are organized under U.S. law(s) and foreign law(s) or exist (e.g., are present, authorized to conduct business) in the United States and one or more foreign jurisdictions, like “foreign persons” completely lacking U.S. status, are apparently subject to sanctions for committing or facilitating sanctionable corrupt acts and human rights abuses. Thus, these “U.S. Persons,” when regarded as “foreign persons” under the Global Magnitsky Act, have additional sanctions exposure that would not apply to, for example, individuals holding only U.S. citizenship or companies organized only under U.S. law(s) and existing only in the United States.
United States Sanctions Corruption and Human Rights Abuses Globally
The financial penalties imposed by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions (and other U.S. sanctions programs) are powerful, as they effectively cut off sanctioned persons from the U.S. financial system and, substantially, U.S. dollar transactions. Given the size and centrality of the U.S. financial system to international commerce and payments, persons without access to U.S. banks and other constituent parts of the U.S. financial system are largely shut out of the international financial system (this assumes, of course, effective enforcement and compliance by U.S. authorities, banks and international financial system participants). Put in context, the United States’ Global Magnitsky Act and sanctions program are singular in their force. Other countries have adopted versions of a Magnitsky Act (including Canada, which has imposed sanctions under its law), but none of these other Magnitsky frameworks rival the potential sweep and impact of the United States’ Magnitsky framework.
Hdeel Abdelhady Discussed Islamic Finance at Harvard Law School
MassPoint’s Founder and Principal, Hdeel Abdelhady, will speak at a program on Islamic Finance at Harvard Law School. Ms. Abdelhady, who has acted as legal counsel to financial institutions, companies, and non-profit organizations on Islamic Finance, banking, and governance matters, teaches a course in Transactional Islamic Law at The George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. The program, entitled “Islamic Finance: Principles and Strategies,” will take place on March 6, 2018 at the Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Program information is available via Harvard Law School.
Money Laundering and Lawyers’ Obligations After the Panama Papers
As Co-Chair of the Middle East Committee of the American Bar Association Section of International Law, MassPoint’s Hdeel Abdelhady organized and will moderate a program on lawyers’ obligations to detect and report illicit client activity, in particular money laundering. Lawyers in the EU, for example, have been required for years to perform client due diligence and file suspicious activity reports (SARs) in accordance EU anti-money laundering directives. U.S. lawyers have no parallel obligations; however, U.S. lawyers are prohibited by rules of professional conduct from knowingly allowing their services to be used for unlawful purposes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has described the inapplicability to U.S. lawyers of customer due diligence (CDD) and SAR filing requirements as a weak spot in the U.S. anti-money laundering framework. Members of Congress have introduced legislation to apply such obligations to U.S. lawyers, and to require U.S. lawyers to collect and share with law enforcement authorities beneficial ownership information where lawyers directly form companies, trusts, and certain other entities for clients.
Panama Papers, Lawyers’ Professional Ethics and Due Diligence Obligations
In April 2016, a New York Times article posited this question: “Has the legal profession lost its moral compass?”
Did the Times ask the right question? Are moral and professional obligations the same? Should they be? What is or should be the role of lawyers in detecting and reporting financial crime, particularly money laundering?
This program will explore rules-based, ethical, and moral obligations of lawyers to detect and report illicit financial activity by clients. Among other topics, we will explore ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), which provides that a lawyer should “not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” In addition, we will examine whether and to what extent American lawyers, like covered financial institutions and some of their European lawyer counterparts, should be obligated to “know their clients” and report suspicious transactions, including from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which recently recommended that the United States apply to lawyers, on a priority basis, “appropriate anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing obligations.”
OFAC Directive 1: Financing, Debt & Equity Prohibitions
On July 30, 2015, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made explicit the sanctioned status of certain entities operating in Russia’s financial services sector by adding them to the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSIL).The SSIL identifies parties subject to U.S. Sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy (Sectoral Sanctions) within the framework of Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions adopted in response to events in Ukraine. Currently Russia’s financial services, defense, and energy sectors are targeted. Nevertheless, they may encounter legal, commercial, or reputational risk in the context of current or planned business with or involving a sanctioned entity, whether listed on the SSIL (or another sanctions list) or sanctioned as a matter of law (such as under the 50% Rule).
Compliance for Financial Institutions: Anticorruption – AML Nexus
Enforcement authorities in the US and Asia reportedly are investigating financial institutions for potentially corrupt employment and business relationships with family members of government officials. The investigations underscore policy links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering regimes where dealings with Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are involved.
This article, published by Hdeel Abdelhady in Butterworths Journal of Banking and Financial Law, briefly discusses the pending investigations and the anti-corruption-AML policy nexus, and suggests, with respect to PEPs and more generally, that financial institutions facilitate fluidity in their compliance programs to allow for the sharing of information and adaptation of compliance protocols across (sometimes impermeable) internal functional and disciplinary lines.