U.S. Lawmakers Raise Possibility of Magnitsky Sanctions on Chinese Officials
According to reports, members of Congress and other U.S. officials have raised the possibility of imposing U.S. financial and/or immigration sanctions on Chinese…
According to reports, members of Congress and other U.S. officials have raised the possibility of imposing U.S. financial and/or immigration sanctions on Chinese…
In a March 28, 2018 letter to the Deputy Secretary of State, a bipartisan group of 57 members of Congress expressed “grave concern,”…
On April 12, 2018, current CIA Director and Secretary of State Nominee, Mike Pompeo, testified before the Senate as part of the confirmation…
April 6, 2018 | By Hdeel Abdelhady United States Directly Sanctions Foreign Government Officials for Corruption On December 20, 2017, the U.S. President…
House of Representatives Calls on Executive Branch to Apply Global Magnitsky Sanctions to Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia On April 10, 2018, the…
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on April 3, 2018 published guidance on the Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions rule (the “CDD Rule) that will come into effect on May 11, 2018. FinCEN’s CDD Guidance, in the form of frequently asked questions, is comprised of 36 questions and answers covering a range of issues, from the scope of due diligence up the ownership chain of legal entities to due diligence requirements applicable (or not) to foreign banks.
The Global Magnitsky Act defines a “foreign person” as “any citizen or national of a foreign state (including any such individual who is also a citizen or national of the United States), or any entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States or existing solely in the United States.” Accordingly, under the Global Magnitsky Act, individuals who are dual (or more) nationals and companies that are organized under U.S. law(s) and foreign law(s) or exist (e.g., are present, authorized to conduct business) in the United States and one or more foreign jurisdictions, like “foreign persons” completely lacking U.S. status, are apparently subject to sanctions for committing or facilitating sanctionable corrupt acts and human rights abuses. Thus, these “U.S. Persons,” when regarded as “foreign persons” under the Global Magnitsky Act, have additional sanctions exposure that would not apply to, for example, individuals holding only U.S. citizenship or companies organized only under U.S. law(s) and existing only in the United States.
The financial penalties imposed by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions (and other U.S. sanctions programs) are powerful, as they effectively cut off sanctioned persons from the U.S. financial system and, substantially, U.S. dollar transactions. Given the size and centrality of the U.S. financial system to international commerce and payments, persons without access to U.S. banks and other constituent parts of the U.S. financial system are largely shut out of the international financial system (this assumes, of course, effective enforcement and compliance by U.S. authorities, banks and international financial system participants). Put in context, the United States’ Global Magnitsky Act and sanctions program are singular in their force. Other countries have adopted versions of a Magnitsky Act (including Canada, which has imposed sanctions under its law), but none of these other Magnitsky frameworks rival the potential sweep and impact of the United States’ Magnitsky framework.
EO 13818 directly targets foreign government officials and private parties who commit or enable human rights abuses and certain corrupt acts. The Order also employs extraordinary theories of liability. For example, EO 13818 holds current and former “leaders” of foreign entities (government and private) strictly and vicariously liable—and thus sanctionable—for the corrupt acts, during a leader’s tenure, of their entities. The Order also imputes the sanctioned status of a blocked private or government entity to its current or former “leaders,” if the entity was blocked “as a result of activities related to the leader’s or official’s tenure.” Additionally, EO 13818 treats as a corrupt act the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of corrupt proceeds by current or former foreign government officials and “persons acting for or on their behalf.” These three bases for liability, among others, are unique to EO 13818—they are not provided for by the Global Magnitsky Act.