Russia Sanctions in Response to Invasion of Ukraine
Russia Sanctions in Response to Ukraine Invasion, by Hdeel Abdelhady February 28, 2022 ▪ Author: Hdeel Abdelhady ▪ Topics: Russia Sanctions, Sanctions In…
U.S. sanctions law
Russia Sanctions in Response to Ukraine Invasion, by Hdeel Abdelhady February 28, 2022 ▪ Author: Hdeel Abdelhady ▪ Topics: Russia Sanctions, Sanctions In…
The imposition of Global Magnitsky anti-corruption sanctions on two Cambodian related to the Ream Naval Base is strategically significant in the context of U.S. concerns about China’s activities and influence in Cambodia.
OFAC issued two general licenses authorizing certain Afghanistan humanitarian aid and activities involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network. The licenses authorize transactions otherwise prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594 (GTSR); the Foreign Terrorist Organization Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 597 (FTOSR); or, Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism,” as amended (EO 13224).
After the 2016 Presidential election, MassPoint PLLC published five issues to watch in 2017 (and beyond). We revisit our predictions on the five issues, which we expect to remain watch-worthy under the Biden Administration.
The United States has targted a Belt& Road project with Global Magnitsky Sanctions. The move is significant, and might signal a ratcheting up of U.S. opposition to the BRI, which has largely comprised rhetoric, diplomatic lobbying, and relatively tepid competition, such as by the establishment of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
The Treasury Department’s announcement of the sanctions speaks to the foreign policy and geostrategic significance of the UDG sanctions action. The release speaks of China’s “malign” investment in Cambodia, its use of the UDG projects in Cambodia to “advance ambitions to project power globally,” “disproportionality benefit” itself through BRI projects, and concerns that the Dara Kakor project “could be converted to “host military assets.” The Treasury Department’s language echoes U.S. concerns about the BRI and other Chinese international project financing activities, including that China engages in “debt trap” financing.
In the second part of her Q&A with Accuity, Hdeel Abdelhady shared her thoughts on the current and potential impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global supply chains, sanctions, and financial crime
In guidance issued on June 5, 2020, OFAC explained that manufacturers in Iran of medicine, PPE, childcare items, and other essential supplies will be exempt from sanctions targeting Iran’s manufacturing sector pursuant to EO 13902.
Hdeel Abdelhady shared her insights with Accuity on the sanctions landscape and the role of lawyers in fighting financial crime