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New U.S. Law Targets China’s Financial Diplomacy, Belt & Road Initiative, World Bank Borrowing

With the passage of the NDAA for FY 2021, we are reminded that the United States views as an issue of “great power competition” China’s financial and infrastructure diplomacy, particularly China’s lending to developing nations and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Congress provided a reminder of the United States’ concerns as to China’s cross-border lending and the BRI. The massive annual defense spending legislation includes two provisions directly on point.

OFAC Asserts Sanctions Jurisdiction Over US-Origin Technology

OFAC’s sanctions enforcement against SITA, the Switzerland-based provider of global air transport technology and services, premised U.S. sanctions jurisdiction on the provision of U.S.-origin technology and the involvement in transactions of networking hardware and servers located in the United States.

OFAC Expanded General License for U.S. Persons to Transact in Certain Inherited and Other Property in Iran

Under amended Section 560.543 of the ISTR, individuals who are U.S. citizens and permanent residents[2]  “are authorized to engage in transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of real and personal property in Iran and to transfer the proceeds to the United States,” but only if the real and personal property was (1) “acquired before the individual became a U.S. person” or (2) was “inherited from persons in Iran.

Nonprofit Organizations and the Foreign Agents Registration Act

FARA was enacted in 1938, but only recently entered the public consciousness through the Special Counsel’s investigation of Trump campaign and administration officials. Following the indictment of Paul Manafort for FARA and other violations, and Michael Flynn’s remedial registration under FARA after his previously undisclosed work on behalf of foreign governments came to light, lobbyists, public relations professionals and law firms, among others, reportedly were moved to register as foreign agents or assess their FARA registration obligations

DOJ China Initiative: Academia, Research & Tech

On national security grounds, the United States is developing and implementing a whole-of-government approach to maintain the country’s technological edge through legal and policy measures to restrict Chinese access to U.S. technology and intellectual property, including by: (1) limiting or prohibiting certain foreign investment and commercial transactions; (2) adopting export controls on emerging technologies; (3) instituting supply chain exclusions; (4) curbing participation in academic and other research; and (5) combating cyber intrusions and industrial and academic espionage.[2] Additionally, concerns about Chinese government influence have spurred proposals to regulate the activities of entities viewed as Chinese government influence operators.

U.S.-China Trade, Technology & Global Policy Issues: INFOGRAPHIC

This graphic depicts key issues between the United States and China, as identified by the United States as of January 26, 2019. This is not an exhaustive depiction, but captures key categories and sub-categories of Chinese state and private practices, state policies, and state structural characteristics that are the subject of U.S. government complaints (as raised from within and outside of the Trump Administration).

Trump’s Africa Strategy Targets Corruption. Extractives, and Chinese Presence

The Trump Administration’s newly released Africa Strategy is likely to bring greater anti-corruption enforcement, particularly against Chinese state-owned and private firms, as well as against African officials, and African and third country private parties. Extractives industries, particularly involving nonfuel minerals like cobalt, are likely to be of particular interest.

Fundamental Research, National Security, and Technology Competition

Fundamental research is excluded from export controls jurisdiction. But given growing concerns about alleged Chinese “academic espionage” at American universities and transfers to China of U.S. scientific and technological information and know-how, including through Chinese students, researchers, and others in fundamental and research pipelines, this excerpt is re-posted separately as foreign (particularly Chinese) access to and participation in U.S. fundamental research may be curbed by non-export controls means.

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