Global Magnitsky Sanctions “a Central Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy”
United States Lobbies G-7 Nations to Adopt Global Magnitsky Sanctions, Now a “Central Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy” As discussed extensively on this…
Hdeel Abdelhady is a Washington, D.C. based lawyer and strategy advisor with advising financial institutions, companies, and government-affiliated entities on transactions and regulatory matters often requiring bespoke, cross-disciplinary, and cross-legal system solutions.
United States Lobbies G-7 Nations to Adopt Global Magnitsky Sanctions, Now a “Central Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy” As discussed extensively on this…
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Beyond the parameters of the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13818 markedly enlarges the range of sanctionable conduct and persons. The differences between the language of EO 13818 and the Global Magnitsky Act are substantive and significant. In several instances, EO 13818 expands sanctions by omitting the Act’s qualifying language, adding new bases for sanctions, and/or leaving key terms undefined. Key instances of EO 13818’s broad and/or uncertain language are discussed below.
The Global Magnitsky Act defines a “foreign person” as “any citizen or national of a foreign state (including any such individual who is also a citizen or national of the United States), or any entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States or existing solely in the United States.” Accordingly, under the Global Magnitsky Act, individuals who are dual (or more) nationals and companies that are organized under U.S. law(s) and foreign law(s) or exist (e.g., are present, authorized to conduct business) in the United States and one or more foreign jurisdictions, like “foreign persons” completely lacking U.S. status, are apparently subject to sanctions for committing or facilitating sanctionable corrupt acts and human rights abuses. Thus, these “U.S. Persons,” when regarded as “foreign persons” under the Global Magnitsky Act, have additional sanctions exposure that would not apply to, for example, individuals holding only U.S. citizenship or companies organized only under U.S. law(s) and existing only in the United States.
The financial penalties imposed by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions (and other U.S. sanctions programs) are powerful, as they effectively cut off sanctioned persons from the U.S. financial system and, substantially, U.S. dollar transactions. Given the size and centrality of the U.S. financial system to international commerce and payments, persons without access to U.S. banks and other constituent parts of the U.S. financial system are largely shut out of the international financial system (this assumes, of course, effective enforcement and compliance by U.S. authorities, banks and international financial system participants). Put in context, the United States’ Global Magnitsky Act and sanctions program are singular in their force. Other countries have adopted versions of a Magnitsky Act (including Canada, which has imposed sanctions under its law), but none of these other Magnitsky frameworks rival the potential sweep and impact of the United States’ Magnitsky framework.
As Co-Chair of the Middle East Committee of the American Bar Association Section of International Law, MassPoint’s Hdeel Abdelhady organized and will moderate a program on lawyers’ obligations to detect and report illicit client activity, in particular money laundering. Lawyers in the EU, for example, have been required for years to perform client due diligence and file suspicious activity reports (SARs) in accordance EU anti-money laundering directives. U.S. lawyers have no parallel obligations; however, U.S. lawyers are prohibited by rules of professional conduct from knowingly allowing their services to be used for unlawful purposes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has described the inapplicability to U.S. lawyers of customer due diligence (CDD) and SAR filing requirements as a weak spot in the U.S. anti-money laundering framework. Members of Congress have introduced legislation to apply such obligations to U.S. lawyers, and to require U.S. lawyers to collect and share with law enforcement authorities beneficial ownership information where lawyers directly form companies, trusts, and certain other entities for clients.
As banks continue to manage regulatory and risk complexity, they should add Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) and general business conduct issues to their nonfinancial risk matrices. ESG and business conduct issues—whether or not the subject to legal prescriptions— are no longer ancillary to risk and reputation management. Nor can ESG and business conduct awareness be regarded as merely ornamentation to enhance corporate appearance (or conceal corporate blemishes).
In April 2016, a New York Times article posited this question: “Has the legal profession lost its moral compass?”
Did the Times ask the right question? Are moral and professional obligations the same? Should they be? What is or should be the role of lawyers in detecting and reporting financial crime, particularly money laundering?
This program will explore rules-based, ethical, and moral obligations of lawyers to detect and report illicit financial activity by clients. Among other topics, we will explore ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), which provides that a lawyer should “not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” In addition, we will examine whether and to what extent American lawyers, like covered financial institutions and some of their European lawyer counterparts, should be obligated to “know their clients” and report suspicious transactions, including from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which recently recommended that the United States apply to lawyers, on a priority basis, “appropriate anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing obligations.”
U.S. dollar dominance in global transactions facilitates the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, including sanctions and anticorruption laws. The FIFA case is highlights the links between dollar dominance and legal jurisdiction.