A”Trump Trade Doctrine”? A Decades-Long Vision of Linking Economic Interests to U.S. Military Might
Is there a Trump trade doctrine? For decades, Trump has linked international trade to U.S. military dominance.
U.S.-China Trade and Tech War on Three Fronts
Much of the talk of trade war between the United States and China, and perhaps other countries, has focused on traditional trade measures and counter-measures like tariffs that strike at the core of international trade: most basically, the movement of goods and services across international borders. But there are two additional fronts of a U.S.-China trade war (thus far): intellectual property and the use of U.S. sanctions and other laws to “coerce and deter” economic rivals like China.
House Bill “Blocks Bailout” of ZTE After Export Ban
On May 17, the House Appropriations Committee unanimously approved a measure to block the Commerce Department from using appropriated funds to alter the export ban (i.e., the “denial order”) that the agency activated against ZTE on April 15, 2018. The ZTE measure was approved as an amendment to the fiscal year 2019 bill funding the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (“Commerce Appropriations Bill”), which was approved by the Appropriations Committee on May 17.
Hdeel Abdelhady Discussed the Michael Cohen Matter on MSNBC
Hdeel Abdelhady joined MSNBC’s Ari Melber on May 9 to discuss developments in the Michael Cohen case, including Michael Avenatti’s report purporting to contain details of Cohen’s transactions with Novartis, AT&T, Viktor Vekselberg and others. Watch the segment here: MassPoint’s Hdeel Abdelhady on The Beat With Ari Melber
Trump Administration Supercharged Global Magnitsky Corruption and Human Rights Sanctions
Beyond the parameters of the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13818 markedly enlarges the range of sanctionable conduct and persons. The differences between the language of EO 13818 and the Global Magnitsky Act are substantive and significant. In several instances, EO 13818 expands sanctions by omitting the Act’s qualifying language, adding new bases for sanctions, and/or leaving key terms undefined. Key instances of EO 13818’s broad and/or uncertain language are discussed below.
Iran Sanctions Update: U.S. Withdrawal From JCPOA
The United States today unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)). The U.S. Treasury Department and the White House have announced that those sanctions that were lifted as part of the JCPOA framework will, as expected, be re-imposed. The Office of Foreign Assets Control at Treasury (OFAC) announced today that it will institute 90-day and 180-day “wind down” periods, after which previously lifted U.S. sanctions will again take effect. For example: Starting August 7, 2018, the import to the United States of Iranian carpets and certain foodstuffs will be prohibited, as will the export and re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services. Starting on November 5, 2018, foreign financial institutions will be subject to U.S. sanctions for transactions with the Iran Central Bank and designated Iranian financial institutions.
Trump Administration Targets Chinese Dominance, Corruption in Africa
Notably, in the two pages of the NSS that are devoted to the National Security Strategy in the Africa context, none of Africa’s 54 nations are mentioned, but China is named twice. The NSS notes with concern China’s “expanding . . . economic military presence in Africa, growing from a small investor in the continent two decades ago into Africa’s largest trading partner today.” China’s methods and influence in Africa are described unflatteringly. “Some Chinese practices,” the NSS states bluntly, “undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments.”
President Trump Promulgates Global Magnitsky Sanctions: EO 13818 Analysis
The Global Magnitsky Sanctions are extraordinary for a number of reasons. First, they are global in reach and require not jurisdictional nexus between the United States and the corrupt acts and human rights abuses they target. As to corruption, both the Global Magnitsky Act and EO 13818 define it broadly, well beyond U.S. and international frameworks that are concerned primarily or exclusively with bribery. The Global Magnitsky Sanctions also depart from U.S. and international anti-corruption frameworks by directly penalizing foreign government officials for corrupt acts.
As discussed above, EO 13818 significantly expands the scope and reach of the Global Magnitsky Act and, in doing so, employs extraordinary theories of liability, such as strict and vicarious liability on the leaders or officials of any foreign entity that engaged in covered corrupt acts. Independently and together, the provisions of EO 13818 empower the United States, and particularly the Executive Branch, to sanction a wide range of persons and conduct without meeting the due process, evidentiary, or other requirements that would apply in U.S. courts.
As indicated in a prior installment of this MassPoint series, 52 individuals and entities have so far been sanctioned under EO 13818. It remains to be seen how the Trump Administration (or subsequent administrations) will implement the Global Magnitsky Sanctions. For now, foreign persons in particular—both government and private—should familiarize themselves with the Global Magnitsky Sanctions and assess their risk for liability, particularly for facilitating corrupt acts such as by transferring the proceeds of corruption.
Trump Attorney’s Curiously Public Suspicious Activity Report
Federal law prohibits the disclosure of the existence of Suspicious Activity Reports. So how did the existence of a Suspicious Activity Report linked to the President’s lawyer become public?