OFAC's sanctions enforcement against SITA, the Switzerland-based provider of global air transport technology and services, premised U.S. sanctions jurisdiction on the provision of U.S.-origin technology and the involvement in transactions of networking hardware and servers located in the United States.
On December 20, 2019, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA), which authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that knowingly sell, lease, or provide vessels for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 or TurkStream pipeline projects. The policies advanced by the NDAA are consistent with prior U.S. policy and legislation, particularly the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. This MassPoint publication discusses PEESA’s policies, sanctions mechanics, the relationship between PEESA and CAATSA, and key takeaways.
General License K authorizes, until 12:01 eastern time on December 20, 2019 (essentially, through the end of December 19 eastern time), the above-listed prohibited transactions where they directly or indirectly involve Cosco or entities owned 50% by Cosco and are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of transactions.”
The September 1 tariffs effective date is close in time to the expiration of the Temporary General License partially easing restrictions on Huawei. The state of U.S.-China trade talks around the expiry of the 90-day license may influence further actions. U.S. and foreign companies subject to export controls should be mindful of the potential links.
Hdeel Abdelhady shared her insights with PaymentsSource on a Russia-led effort to build a non-U.S. dollar payments system, to insulate against U.S. sanctions and U.S. control more broadly. Ms. Abdelhady has for years worked on the U.S.-dollar and financial system links to U.S. sanctions enforcement jurisdiction. Her work on the topic of U.S. dollar and financial system tied legal jurisdiction has been quoted, leveraged, and consulted frequently in the United States and abroad.
On June 21, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an interim final rule (IFR) substantially revising sanctions reporting regulations. The most significant amendment was to OFAC’s rejected transactions reporting rule, which now, for the first time, applies not just to U.S. financial institutions, but also to U.S. businesses, nonprofits, and individuals. The rule also appears to apply to foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Public comments on the IFR are due by July 22, 2019.
After talks with China’s president at the G20 summit in Japan, President Trump announced on June 29 that “he would allow” U.S. companies to continue to sell “product” to Huawei. The statement, construed by some as a “concession” or “reversal” of U.S. policy toward Huawei, has generated confusion and disagreement from China “hawks” in Congress and elsewhere. This rundown of Huawei legal and policy issues discusses the presidential statement, its lack of legal effect to date, its context, and why technology industry stakeholders need to understand the complete U.S.-China technology picture to navigate developments and mitigate risk.
MassPoint's Hdeel Abdelhady spoke with NPR about the ratcheting up of U.S. sanctions, secondary sanctions, and the potential consequences of sanctions overuse. To learn more about the mechanics of U.S. sanctions, and particularly about the role of the American dollar, financial system, and economy in extending the global reach of U.S. sanctions, read Hdeel Abdelhady's Reuters insight piece, Reimposed U.S. anti-Iran sanctions leverage American economic power.
The Haverly case is instructive as it clarifies OFAC’s position, with respect to Haverly and likely more broadly, as to the meaning of “debt” under Directive 2, which prohibits, by U.S. persons and within the United States, dealings in “new debt” issued by parties that are listed on the OFAC-maintained Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSIL) or not so listed but are owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties.
The Global Magnitsky Sanctions apply worldwide, without any requirement of a jurisdictional nexus with the United States. They define corruption broadly enough to capture a wide range of conduct and persons. The sanctions target “serious human rights abuse,” but do not define the term. Moreover, the sanctions are readily deployable. No tailored legislation, executive order, or other administrative process—other than a sanctions determination by the Secretary of Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State—is required to impose sanctions anywhere, anytime. Given their global reach, substantive breadth, and wide applicability, the Global Magnitsky Sanctions have distinct utility value as they can be readily employed for multiple legal, policy and strategic objectives. They are the Swiss Army Knife of sanctions. To date, 78 individuals and entities have been sanctioned for corruption and human rights abuses. The most recent of these sanctions actions, against Turkey, has triggered speculation as to its motives and objectives. This is discussed below, as are some of the provisions that suggest the Global Magnitsky Sanctions were formulated for sweeping applicability and enforcement latitude.