On December 20, 2019, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA), which authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that knowingly sell, lease, or provide vessels for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 or TurkStream pipeline projects. The policies advanced by the NDAA are consistent with prior U.S. policy and legislation, particularly the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. This MassPoint publication discusses PEESA’s policies, sanctions mechanics, the relationship between PEESA and CAATSA, and key takeaways.
General License K authorizes, until 12:01 eastern time on December 20, 2019 (essentially, through the end of December 19 eastern time), the above-listed prohibited transactions where they directly or indirectly involve Cosco or entities owned 50% by Cosco and are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of transactions.”
Hdeel Abdelhady shared her insights with PaymentsSource on a Russia-led effort to build a non-U.S. dollar payments system, to insulate against U.S. sanctions and U.S. control more broadly. Ms. Abdelhady has for years worked on the U.S.-dollar and financial system links to U.S. sanctions enforcement jurisdiction. Her work on the topic of U.S. dollar and financial system tied legal jurisdiction has been quoted, leveraged, and consulted frequently in the United States and abroad.
On June 21, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an interim final rule (IFR) substantially revising sanctions reporting regulations. The most significant amendment was to OFAC’s rejected transactions reporting rule, which now, for the first time, applies not just to U.S. financial institutions, but also to U.S. businesses, nonprofits, and individuals. The rule also appears to apply to foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Public comments on the IFR are due by July 22, 2019.
MassPoint's Hdeel Abdelhady spoke with NPR about the ratcheting up of U.S. sanctions, secondary sanctions, and the potential consequences of sanctions overuse. To learn more about the mechanics of U.S. sanctions, and particularly about the role of the American dollar, financial system, and economy in extending the global reach of U.S. sanctions, read Hdeel Abdelhady's Reuters insight piece, Reimposed U.S. anti-Iran sanctions leverage American economic power.
The Haverly case is instructive as it clarifies OFAC’s position, with respect to Haverly and likely more broadly, as to the meaning of “debt” under Directive 2, which prohibits, by U.S. persons and within the United States, dealings in “new debt” issued by parties that are listed on the OFAC-maintained Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSIL) or not so listed but are owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties.
As anti-corruption standards and enforcement practices become more uniform, cooperation among enforcement authorities will increase in frequency and effectiveness. In the FCPA enforcement context and in others, authorities have imposed record-setting fines, and likely will continue to do so with greater frequency, particularly where violations are egregious, widespread, or have broad impact. In such an environment, monetary penalties for avoidable violations may no longer be absorbable as the cost of doing business. As a matter of good business practice, companies of all sizes should take steps to strengthen compliance programs appropriately for their industries, organizational structures, home obligations, and the jurisdictions in which they do business.
Under amended Section 560.543 of the ISTR, individuals who are U.S. citizens and permanent residents “are authorized to engage in transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of real and personal property in Iran and to transfer the proceeds to the United States,” but only if the real and personal property was (1) “acquired before the individual became a U.S. person” or (2) was “inherited from persons in Iran.
Now that the Trump Administration has declared a policy to reduce dependency on foreign sources for critical minerals, how will the Administration go about achieving its stated objective? What legal consequences—including in the areas of national security, trade, anti-corruption, and environmental law—might flow? Our multi-disciplinary panel will discuss the science and practical importance of “critical minerals,” recent and potential U.S. legal and policy developments, and the potential impacts of U.S. actions on minerals on manufacturing, supply chains, and the markets.
The Trump Administration's newly released Africa Strategy is likely to bring greater anti-corruption enforcement, particularly against Chinese state-owned and private firms, as well as against African officials, and African and third country private parties. Extractives industries, particularly involving nonfuel minerals like cobalt, are likely to be of particular interest.