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Hdeel Abdelhady - Economic Sanctions, Emerging Technologies Exports, CFIUS

 

Hdeel Abdelhady
Principal
Email │ Phone: +1 (202) 630-2512 │ LinkedIn

Hdeel Abdelhady is MassPoint PLLC’s founder and principal. She focuses on international trade, namely sanctions, emerging technologies export controls, foreign investment in the United States (CFIUS), anti-corruption, and anti-money laundering.

In the international trade area, Ms. Abdelhady focuses on established and evolving law, regulation, and policy pertaining to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and battery technology.

Ms. Abdelhady created and a one-of-a-kind law school course on Regulation of Foreign Access to U.S. Technology, covering the continuum of key laws, regulations, and policies designed ultimately to maintain U.S. technological leadership in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, advance semiconductors, and robotics, from foreign investment in the United States to export controls and sanctions.

The course also covers existing law and policy applicable to academic and other research environments, and the U.S.-China tech race. She currently teaches the course at The George Washington University Law School, were she has served part-time as a Professorial Lecturer in Law for 20 years.

Prior to founding MassPoint PLLC, Ms. Abdelhady practiced law with two major U.S.-based law firms, and has served as secondment counsel to two banks, both in  Washington, D.C. and in Dubai.

Ms. Abdelhady publishes frequently in her areas of practice and academic instruction. Her writings have appeared in, among other publications, the World Bank Legal Review, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, the Sustainable Law and Development Journal, Law360, Reuters, and Ahram Online.

  • Fellow of the American Bar Foundation
  • Member, Board of Directors, Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists, DC Chapter
  • Member, ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession
  • MassPoint PLLC, Corporate Law Firm of the Year, USA, Finance Monthly Global Awards
  • Corporate: M&A and Governance, Who’s Who Legal 2016 
  • Past Co-Chair, ABA Middle East Committee

JD, The George Washington University Law School 

  • Member, Moot Court Executive Board
  • Chairwoman, Van Vleck Constitutional Law Moot Court Competition
  • “Best Overall Competitor” and “Best Oralist” awards, Van Vleck Constitutional Law Moot Court competition
  • Class of 2002 Clinics Volunteer Service Award
  • President, Street Law Student Association
  • Law Clerk, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division
  • Judicial Intern, Superior Court of the District of Columbia

BA; Political Science, History (Middle East and Africa), University of Pittsburgh

  • District of Columbia
  • Commonwealth of Virginia
  • State of Maryland
  • United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
  • World Bank Group Can be Sued for “Commercial Activity” Says SCOTUS (Jam/IFC), MassPoint PLLC, March 2019.
  • ISIS’ Islamic Stagecraft,” Ahram Weekly, October 2017 (or read the reader-friendly PDF here).
  • Editor, 2015 Middle East Legal Developments in Review (Advance Copy), American Bar Association Section of International Law Middle East Committee.
  • Harmonization of Global Sales Law, UNCITRAL Asia Pacific Incheon Spring Conferences, Incheon, South Korea, June 2015.
  • The CISG in Foreign Legal Systems (or not), Speaker, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law – Georgetown Law Global Sales Law Conference: The CISG at 35: Challenges Today, Washington, D.C., January 2o15.
  • Egypt’s New Investment Law Misses the Mark, Ahram Online, June 4, 2014.
  • The Selective Piety of Egypt’s Islamists, Ahram Online, June 23, 2013.
  • The Real Revolution Underway in Egypt, Ahram Online, December 2012.
  • Rule of Law in Egypt; Challenges for Democracy, Moderator, Aspen Institute, Washington, D.C. 2011, September 22, 2011.
  • Pillars of a Modern and Democratic Egyptian Constitution, Egypt Revolution Conference, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2011.
  • Egypt Needs a Mindset Revolution (to transition economically), Ahram Weekly, October 6, 2011.
  • Egypt’s Prosecutor General Must Advance the Rule of Law, Ahram Online July 25, 2011.
  • Partners for Change: Realizing the Potential of Arab Women in the Private and Public Sectors, Arab International Women’s Forum, World Bank, Washington, D.C., June 2008.
  • The Impact of Islam in the Constitution of Iraq, Public International Law & Policy Group Roundtable Series on Next Steps for Implementing the Iraq Constitution, Washington, D.C., January 2006.
  • The Impact of Islam in the Constitution of Iraq, Public International Law & Policy Group Roundtable Series on Next Steps for Implementing the Iraq Constitution, Washington, D.C., January 2006.
  • Issues in Federalism: Negotiation Simulation on the Formation of Regions in Iraq, Public International Law & Policy Group Roundtable Series on Next Steps for Implementing the Iraq Constitution, Washington, D.C., January 2006.
  • Investor-State Dispute Prevention: Egypt, Presentation for the International Finance Corporation, the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, and the Egyptian General Authority for Investment, Washington, D.C. 2013.
  • Go Global, Grow Local: Positioning the DC Metro Area to Tap the Global Aspiration Economy, The 2030 Group Blog 2012.
  • Montgomery County Today: Changing Community and Transformative Opportunity, Co-organizer and speaker (program on health sector growth) 2012.
  • Islamic Finance as a Mechanism for Bolstering Food Security in the Middle East: Food Security Waqf, Eighth International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Doha, Qatar 2011.
  • Middle East Economic Outlook, Interview with Chief Economist of the DIFC, Interviewer, ABA Islamic Finance Committee Podcast, DIFC (Dubai), UAE 2010.
  • China-Africa Trade and Investment: Is it a Two-Way Street?, Program Writer and Chair, Washington, D.C., 2007.
  • Foreign Direct Investment and Investment Dispute Settlement, International Dispute Resolution for the Washington, D.C. Diplomatic Community, Washington, D.C., June 2006.
  • Investment Risks in International Oil and Gas Contracts, Conference on Managing Risk in International Oil and Gas Contracts (under the auspices of the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum), Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, Cairo, Egypt, May 2006; Conference on Managing Risk in International Oil and Gas Contracts (under the auspices of the Libyan National Oil Company), Tripoli, Libya, May 2006.

MassPoint PLLC’s law blog. Sanctions Blog, Emerging Technologies Blog, Hdeel Abdelhady

Fly Baghdad Sanctioned As "specially Designated Global Terrorist"

U.S. Sanctions Fly Baghdad

Fly Baghdad, CEO, and Aircraft as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" Author: Hdeel Abdelhady The United States sanctioned Fly Baghdad, a privately owned commercial airline based in Iraq. The sanctions designation is pursuant to Executive order 13224 as amended by EO 13886…

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Rare Earths Export Controls

China Restricts Rare Earths Exports

China Restricts Exports of Rare Earths Processing Tech Author: Hdeel Abdelhady Once again, China appears to take a page from the U.S. export controls playbook amidst the ongoing U.S.-China tech race, formalizes rare earths export controls. China has restricted exports of…

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Crimea Sanctions

Swedbank Latvia Settlement: Sanctions Compliance Lessons

OFAC - Swedbank Latvia Settlement Settlement Highlights Importance of Integrating Geolocation and Know Your Customer Data By Hdeel Abdelhady | June 23, 2023 | PDF The recent settlement between the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Swedbank Latvia for apparent…

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Who’s Who Legal Recognizes Hdeel Abdelhady

May 2016 Who’s Who Legal has recognized Hdeel Abdelhady for Corporate: M&A and Governance, in its 2016 listing of the world’s leading lawyers.  Who’s Who Legal is a global listing of top lawyers who are selected for inclusion by surveying private practitioners,…

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Russia Sanctions in Response to Invasion of Ukraine

The United States and its allies have unleashed a barrage of sanctions on Russia, in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Here, we discuss some of the blocking and non-blocking sanctions imposed on VTB, VEB, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, and Russia's Central bank.
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OFAC Ties Sanctions Authority To U.S. Origin Technology.

Sanctions: OFAC Authorizes Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan

Sanctions Update ▪ October 4, 2021 ▪  PDF OFAC Authorizes Afghanistan Humanitarian Aid and Activities Otherwise Prohibited by Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Publishes FAQs On September 24, 2021, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued two general licenses…

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New U.S. Law Targets China’s Financial Diplomacy, Belt & Road Initiative, World Bank Borrowing

With the passage of the NDAA for FY 2021, we are reminded that the United States views as an issue of “great power competition” China’s financial and infrastructure diplomacy, particularly China’s lending to developing nations and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Congress provided a reminder of the United States’ concerns as to China’s cross-border lending and the BRI. The massive annual defense spending legislation includes two provisions directly on point.
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TikTok: China’s Export Controls Set in Motion Unprecedented Legal Scenario

On August 14, President Trump ordered ByteDance to divest its assets and interests in TikTok. What happens if ByteDance does not comply? The question may seem academic, given historical compliance with divestment orders and ByteDance’s talks with U.S. companies about TikTok’s sale. But a recent legal move by China—its expansion of a list of technologies that require government approval for export, including apparently in a sale of TikTok—renders real the issue of non-compliance with the August 14 divestment order, and potentially raises unprecedented issues.
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OFAC Ties Sanctions Authority To U.S. Origin Technology.

OFAC Ties Sanctions Authority to US-Origin Technology

OFAC's sanctions enforcement against SITA, the Switzerland-based provider of global air transport technology and services, premised U.S. sanctions jurisdiction on the provision of U.S.-origin technology and the involvement in transactions of networking hardware and servers located in the United States.
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Semiconductor Export Controls

AI Panel Recommends Semiconductor Hardware Export Controls

Perceiving China’s technological ascendance as a threat, the United States has imposed defensive legal measures, including export controls, to curb foreign access to U.S. technology by illicit and lawful means. The approach has bipartisan backing across the U.S. government.
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U.S. Sanctions on Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream Pipeline Projects (PEESA)

On December 20, 2019, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA), which authorizes the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that knowingly sell, lease, or provide vessels for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 or TurkStream pipeline projects. The policies advanced by the NDAA are consistent with prior U.S. policy and legislation, particularly the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. This MassPoint publication discusses PEESA’s policies, sanctions mechanics, the relationship between PEESA and CAATSA, and key takeaways.
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OFAC Cosco Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co., Ltd. General License K: Analysis

General License K authorizes, until 12:01 eastern time on December 20, 2019 (essentially, through the end of December 19 eastern time), the above-listed prohibited transactions where they directly or indirectly involve Cosco or entities owned 50% by Cosco and are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the maintenance or wind down of transactions.”
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U.S. Sanctions Chinese Shipping Companies: Legal and Practical Points

The imposition of sanctions on the Chinese companies and executives—particularly on units of the high-profile, state-owned COSCO at a critical juncture in the U.S.-China trade war and shortly after both countries took conciliatory steps—reinforces the Trump Administration’s stated posture of aggressively enforcing Iran secondary sanctions in furtherance of its policy objectives.
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Global Payments: Hdeel Abdelhady on a Russia-led Non-Dollar Payments System

Hdeel Abdelhady shared her insights with PaymentsSource on a Russia-led effort to build a non-U.S. dollar payments system, to insulate against U.S. sanctions and U.S. control more broadly. Ms. Abdelhady has for years worked on the U.S.-dollar and financial system links to U.S. sanctions enforcement jurisdiction. Her work on the topic of U.S. dollar and financial system tied legal jurisdiction has been quoted, leveraged, and consulted frequently in the United States and abroad.
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Hdeel Abdelhady - Economic Sanctions, Emerging Technologies Exports, CFIUS

Hdeel Abdelhady Named American Bar Foundation Fellow

Hdeel Abdelhady has been named a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, a “global honorary society of attorneys, judges, law faculty, and legal scholars. Membership in the Fellows is limited to one percent of lawyers licensed to practice in each jurisdiction. Fellows are recommended by their peers and elected by the Board of the American Bar Foundation.
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OFAC Ties Sanctions Authority To U.S. Origin Technology.

OFAC Expands Reporting Requirements

On June 21, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an interim final rule (IFR) substantially revising sanctions reporting regulations. The most significant amendment was to OFAC’s rejected transactions reporting rule, which now, for the first time, applies not just to U.S. financial institutions, but also to U.S. businesses, nonprofits, and individuals. The rule also appears to apply to foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Public comments on the IFR are due by July 22, 2019.
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Huawei and the U.S.-China Tech War

After talks with China’s president at the G20 summit in Japan, President Trump announced on June 29 that “he would allow” U.S. companies to continue to sell “product” to Huawei. The statement, construed by some as a “concession” or “reversal” of U.S. policy toward Huawei, has generated confusion and disagreement from China “hawks” in Congress and elsewhere. This rundown of Huawei legal and policy issues discusses the presidential statement, its lack of legal effect to date, its context, and why technology industry stakeholders need to understand the complete U.S.-China technology picture to navigate developments and mitigate risk.
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Digital Dating as a Matter of National Security: Grindr-CFIUS

Is a dating app a national security asset? Yes, in some cases. Foreign investment in U.S. businesses that collect and maintain U.S. citizens’ sensitive personal data is subject to national security reviews by CFIUS. From social networking to financial services to healthcare to consumer retail, companies across sectors collect, maintain, and have access to the sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. The implications of the personal data-national security nexus are potentially wide-ranging for foreign investment in U.S. businesses.
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Rare Earths Export Controls

China’s Rare Earths Export Controls: A Page From U.S. Law?

China might take a targeted approach to any restrictions on rare earth elements that echoes, or effectively duplicates, the approach of the United States, which is to control exports based on "end use" and "end user" where one or both conflict with or potentially undermine U.S. national security interests (which include technological leadership and economic security).
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Hdeel Abdelhady on NPR: United States Ratchets Up Iran and North Korea Sanctions

MassPoint's Hdeel Abdelhady spoke with NPR about the ratcheting up of U.S. sanctions, secondary sanctions, and the potential consequences of sanctions overuse. To learn more about the mechanics of U.S. sanctions, and particularly about the role of the American dollar, financial system, and economy in extending the global reach of U.S. sanctions, read Hdeel Abdelhady's Reuters insight piece, Reimposed U.S. anti-Iran sanctions leverage American economic power.
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U.S.-China Tech War: Whole of Government Legal Strategy

The U.S. government has adopted and is implementing a “whole-of-government” strategy to counter China. The whole-of-government approach entails a range of legal and policy measures to curb China’s access to U.S. technology, by lawful and unlawful means. These measures include, but are not limited to, stricter curbs on foreign investment in U.S. technology; restrictions on exports of “emerging technologies” like artificial intelligence; exclusions of Chinese firms from U.S. government and private supply chains through company bans; prosecutions of intellectual property theft; measures to counter “academic espionage” in American academic and research institutions; and, indirectly, and, indirectly, sanctions enforcement.
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Russia Sectoral Sanctions Directives Apply to Trade-Based Debt: Analysis

The Haverly case is instructive as it clarifies OFAC’s position, with respect to Haverly and likely more broadly, as to the meaning of “debt” under Directive 2, which prohibits, by U.S. persons and within the United States, dealings in “new debt” issued by parties that are listed on the OFAC-maintained Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSIL) or not so listed but are owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties.
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Huawei Ownership and the Foreign Agents Registration Act

The United States has adopted a whole-of-government approach to counter China’s “economic aggression” or “economic espionage,” umbrella terms that encompass a range of conduct including IP theft, forced technology transfer, academic espionage, and influence operations in the United States. The whole-of-government approach illustrates that the most strategically significant and complex confrontation between the United States and China is not the “trade war.” Rather, the race to dominate future technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G underpins the most complex legal and policy issues between the two nations. The U.S.-China tech war, and the United States’ whole-of-government strategy, has put Chinese technology companies under the hot light of U.S. legal and political scrutiny. Companies like Huawei and ZTE, relative unknowns in the United States until recently, have found themselves on the wrong side of U.S. law enforcement.
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Iran Sanctions

OFAC Expanded General License for U.S. Persons to Transact in Certain Inherited and Other Property in Iran

Under amended Section 560.543 of the ISTR, individuals who are U.S. citizens and permanent residents[2]  “are authorized to engage in transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the sale of real and personal property in Iran and to transfer the proceeds to the United States,” but only if the real and personal property was (1) “acquired before the individual became a U.S. person” or (2) was “inherited from persons in Iran.
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Nonprofit Organizations and the Foreign Agents Registration Act

FARA was enacted in 1938, but only recently entered the public consciousness through the Special Counsel’s investigation of Trump campaign and administration officials. Following the indictment of Paul Manafort for FARA and other violations, and Michael Flynn’s remedial registration under FARA after his previously undisclosed work on behalf of foreign governments came to light, lobbyists, public relations professionals and law firms, among others, reportedly were moved to register as foreign agents or assess their FARA registration obligations
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Hdeel Abdelhady - Economic Sanctions, Emerging Technologies Exports, CFIUS

DOJ China Initiative: Academia, Research & Tech

On national security grounds, the United States is developing and implementing a whole-of-government approach to maintain the country’s technological edge through legal and policy measures to restrict Chinese access to U.S. technology and intellectual property, including by: (1) limiting or prohibiting certain foreign investment and commercial transactions; (2) adopting export controls on emerging technologies; (3) instituting supply chain exclusions; (4) curbing participation in academic and other research; and (5) combating cyber intrusions and industrial and academic espionage.[2] Additionally, concerns about Chinese government influence have spurred proposals to regulate the activities of entities viewed as Chinese government influence operators.
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U.S.-China Trade, Technology & Global Policy Issues: INFOGRAPHIC

This graphic depicts key issues between the United States and China, as identified by the United States as of January 26, 2019. This is not an exhaustive depiction, but captures key categories and sub-categories of Chinese state and private practices, state policies, and state structural characteristics that are the subject of U.S. government complaints (as raised from within and outside of the Trump Administration).
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US-China Risks to American Academia Are So Real They Are Insurable

If there remain doubts that the U.S.-China trade war and technology war present real risks for U.S. colleges and universities, a recent report that a U.S. university has secured insurance against the risk of material reductions in Chinese student enrollment should put those doubts to bed. The risks are so real that they are insurable.
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DOJ Initiative Takes on “Chinese Economic Espionage:” Legal Issues for Academia

The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently launched an initiative to “Combat Chinese Economic Espionage.” Announced on November 1, 2018 by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the China Initiative acts on the Trump Administration’s previous findings “concerning China’s practices” and “reflects the Department’s strategic priority of countering Chinese national security threats and reinforces the President’s overall national security strategy.” The China Initiative presents emerging issues for academia, the technology industry, and the private sector broadly.
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Hdeel Abdelhady - Economic Sanctions, Emerging Technologies Exports, CFIUS

Private Property Rights in Space: Galloway Symposium

MassPoint's Principal, Hdeel Abdelhady, presented on Rule of Law in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space at the annual Galloway Symposium on Critical Issues in Space Law. Ms. Abdelhady, along with her co-panelists, engaged in a comparative law discussion.
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Brain Drain: Emerging Technologies Export Controls Could Spur Tech Inversions

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, has begun the process of identifying "emerging technologies" that are essential to national security and, consequently, require export control. New export controls on emerging technologies could be burdensome, depending on the content of regulations and the manner of their enforcement. If the new regulatory regime is burdensome to the point that it prohibits (legally or practically) some emerging technology transfers to foreign parties, companies and others involved in emerging technologies-- particularly their development--may seek arrangements, without evading or otherwise violating ECRA or applicable regulations, to ease collaborations and other engagement with foreign parties, including by some form of technology inversion.
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American Economic Power Fuels Sanctions

America's economic and financial heft facilitates the extraterritorial reach of U.S. sanctions and other law. For example, global transactions denominated in U.S. dollars and processed through the U.S. financial system create a jurisdictional nexus between the United States and foreign parties, property, and events.
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Global Magnitsky Sanctions FAQs

The Global Magnitsky Act and Global Magnitsky Sanctions (GMS) are in the public discourse as a result of recent events, such as the case of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the imposition of Global Magnitsky Sanctions on two Turkish officials in August. To help the public understand the Global Magnitsky framework, MassPoint Legal and Strategy Advisory has published the Global Magnitsky Sanctions FAQs
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Tech Wars: Restrictions on Foreign Access to U.S. Technology

Measures to curb foreign access to U.S. technology have taken and will likely take various forms that will cut across industries and legal disciplines. Among them, as discussed below, are restrictions on foreign access to and influence on U.S. technology through (1) foreign investment, (2) supply chain exclusions, (3) limits on participation in academic and other research, (4) legal or political curbs on U.S. technology access or transfers through third countries, and (5) countermeasures against foreign control of raw materials essential to technological manufacturing and innovation.
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Weaponizing The Law For Trade Objectives Raises Issues

U.S. Law as Trade War Weapon

The ZTE case puts into focus the Trump Administration’s apparent strategy to use U.S. sanctions, along with anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws, as trade war weapons, specifically as “economic tools” and “tools of economic diplomacy” that “can be important parts of broader strategies to deter, coerce, and constrain adversaries.”
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Technology, Human Rights and Sanctions

Some Congress members are lobbying the Administration to impose human rights sanctions on Chinese officials and companies responsible for or complicit in abuses against China’s Uighur Muslim minority and other minorities. Two companies named, Dahua Technology and Hikvision, are very large, China-based global firms that produce surveillance products and systems. The bottom line is that the tech industry should take note of the development (even if no sanctions are imposed), as it foreshadows the legal and reputation risk issues they will, without doubt, face in connection with tech-enabled abuses, privacy encroachments, and other conduct by consumers of tech products and services.
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OFAC Ties Sanctions Authority To U.S. Origin Technology.

Global Magnitsky Sanctions: The Swiss Army Knife

The Global Magnitsky Sanctions apply worldwide, without any requirement of a jurisdictional nexus with the United States. They define corruption broadly enough to capture a wide range of conduct and persons. The sanctions target “serious human rights abuse,” but do not define the term. Moreover, the sanctions are readily deployable. No tailored legislation, executive order, or other administrative process—other than a sanctions determination by the Secretary of Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State—is required to impose sanctions anywhere, anytime. Given their global reach, substantive breadth, and wide applicability, the Global Magnitsky Sanctions have distinct utility value as they can be readily employed for multiple legal, policy and strategic objectives. They are the Swiss Army Knife of sanctions. To date, 78 individuals and entities have been sanctioned for corruption and human rights abuses. The most recent of these sanctions actions, against Turkey, has triggered speculation as to its motives and objectives. This is discussed below, as are some of the provisions that suggest the Global Magnitsky Sanctions were formulated for sweeping applicability and enforcement latitude.
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A Localized Approach to Anti-corruption in Afghanistan’s Mining Sector

Thinking beyond the parameters of standard "international development" and industry playbooks, the lack of progress (or, in some cases, regression) in developing Afghanistan's mining sector should induce interested government, industry and nongovernmental actors to consider if and how laws, policies and technical assistance can be formulated, modified and implemented in ways that might enhance their effectiveness in practice, rather than just on paper. Afghanistan, as is well known, is a Muslim majority nation in which Islamic law (as locally interpreted and implemented formally and informally) plays a significant role. Islamic law (Shari'ah), provides rules and precedents applicable not only to family matters and ritual worship, but also to business transactions, public governance, market regulation, and limitations on government dominion over private property. in these areas, and others, Islamic law and historical practices provide rules and precedents applicable to the regulation, administration and conduct of mining and other extractives businesses. These laws and precedents are just as robust, and more so in some cases, as international and foreign laws and standards.
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Iran Sanctions

Personal Remittances and Proceeds of Inheritances from Iran After U.S. Withdrawal from Iran Deal

For U.S. persons seeking to engage in permitted noncommercial, personal remittance or inheritance-related transactions, the higher risk sensitivity of some third country (and U.S.-based) financial institutions may complicate (or thwart in some cases), legal transactions. In light of this, persons seeking to engage in such legal transactions in the post-U.S. JCPOA withdrawal environment should exercise extra care in initiating and executing legal transfers with third country financial institutions.
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Canary in the Cobalt Mine: Glencore Corruption Probe May Not Be a One Off

The U.S. arm of Glencore, the global commodities trading and mining giant, has been served a subpoena by the U.S. Department of Justice, according to news accounts. The DOJ's subpoena reportedly seeks documents and information pertaining Glencore's business in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Venezuela to assess potential violations of U.S. anti-money laundering laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the principal U.S. law essentially prohibiting the bribery of foreign officials for business gain by U.S. companies and others subject to United States' jurisdiction (broadly construed and applied).The Glencore subpoena may not be a one-off and it should be viewed-- at least for risk assessment and compliance improvement purposes-- as potentially part of a larger U.S. strategy to proactively target corruption and, by extension, money laundering, in Africa and Africa's extractives industries. (The wider context is that the Trump Administration views U.S. anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and sanctions laws and their enforcement as "tools of economic diplomacy", including to advance trade and other policy objectives).
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Fly Baghdad Sanctioned As "specially Designated Global Terrorist"

Global Magnitsky Regulations: U.S. Multinationals and Dual Citizens Have Heightened Sanctions Exposure

U.S. multinational companies/entities as well as dual citizens/nationals should understand their heightened sanctions exposure under the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13,818 and the GloMag Regulations. Multinational companies/entities would be well-advised to update their risk-based compliance programs and educate their relevant personnel to make compliance more likely, including by avoiding inadvertent violations of the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13,818 and the GloMag Regs.
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ZTE: Was the Export Ban the Right Penalty?

The sentiments expressed by Senator Rubio and others reflect commercial, competition, policy, and strategic concerns held by business, policy makers, defense and national security officials, and others about China and Chinese firms like ZTE and Huawei. But when raised in the context of and as a justification for a specific legal enforcement action, the sentiments blur the lines between what should primarily be an enforcement based on facts and applicable laws, rather than an instrument for advancing wider policy objectives that are not specifically advanced by the laws applicable to the conduct for which ZTE was penalized. And, while Secretary Ross' stated rationale to impose the harsher penalty to change ZTE's behavior may have been sound, the recommendation of the career professionals with expertise in sanctions and export controls enforcement should, perhaps, have carried the day. Secretary Ross' description of the process leading to the export ban and the mess that has followed it give more reason to ask whether, in the first place, the export ban was the appropriate remedy as a matter of applicable laws and the objectives served by them.
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Decoding Trump on Trade

Other of Mr. Trump’s statements, including dating back decades, hint that he views trade as “unfair” when other nations fail to compensate the United States for providing the secure conditions under which they trade and prosper. In 1987, Citizen Trump took out full page ads in three major newspapers criticizing U.S. “foreign defense policy” for its lack of “backbone.” Why, asked Mr. Trump, were foreign nations like Japan “not paying the United States for the human lives and billions of dollars we are losing to protect their interests?” In a 1988 interview with Oprah Winfrey, Mr. Trump wondered why Kuwait, “where the poorest people live like kings,” was not paying the United States “25 percent of what they’re making” from oil sales when “we make it possible for them to sell their oil.”  More recently, to extract trade concessions, the President reminded South Korea of its reliance on the United States for its security.
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U.S.-China Trade and Tech War on Three Fronts

Much of the talk of trade war between the United States and China, and perhaps other countries, has focused on traditional trade measures and counter-measures like tariffs that strike at the core of international trade: most basically, the movement of goods and services across international borders. But there are two additional fronts of a U.S.-China trade war (thus far): intellectual property and the use of U.S. sanctions and other laws to "coerce and deter" economic rivals like China.
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Trump Administration Supercharged Global Magnitsky Corruption and Human Rights Sanctions

Beyond the parameters of the Global Magnitsky Act, EO 13818 markedly enlarges the range of sanctionable conduct and persons. The differences between the language of EO 13818 and the Global Magnitsky Act are substantive and significant. In several instances, EO 13818 expands sanctions by omitting the Act’s qualifying language, adding new bases for sanctions, and/or leaving key terms undefined. Key instances of EO 13818’s broad and/or uncertain language are discussed below.
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Iran Sanctions

Iran Sanctions Update: U.S. Withdrawal From JCPOA

The United States today unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)). The U.S. Treasury Department and the White House have announced that those sanctions that were lifted as part of the JCPOA framework will, as expected, be re-imposed. The Office of Foreign Assets Control at Treasury (OFAC) announced today that it will institute 90-day and 180-day “wind down” periods, after which previously lifted U.S. sanctions will again take effect. For example: Starting August 7, 2018, the import to the United States of Iranian carpets and certain foodstuffs will be prohibited, as will the export and re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services. Starting on November 5, 2018, foreign financial institutions will be subject to U.S. sanctions for transactions with the Iran Central Bank and designated Iranian financial institutions.
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Trump Administration Targets Chinese Dominance, Corruption in Africa

Notably, in the two pages of the NSS that are devoted to the National Security Strategy in the Africa context, none of Africa’s 54 nations are mentioned, but China is named twice. The NSS notes with concern China’s “expanding . . . economic military presence in Africa, growing from a small investor in the continent two decades ago into Africa’s largest trading partner today.” China’s methods and influence in Africa are described unflatteringly.  “Some Chinese practices,” the NSS states bluntly, “undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments.”
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U.S. Multinationals, Dual Citizens Subject to Global Magnitsky Sanctions

The Global Magnitsky Act defines a "foreign person" as "any citizen or national of a foreign state (including any such individual who is also a citizen or national of the United States), or any entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States or existing solely in the United States." Accordingly, under the Global Magnitsky Act, individuals who are dual (or more) nationals and companies that are organized under U.S. law(s) and foreign law(s) or exist (e.g., are present, authorized to conduct business) in the United States and one or more foreign jurisdictions, like “foreign persons” completely lacking U.S. status, are apparently subject to sanctions for committing or facilitating sanctionable corrupt acts and human rights abuses. Thus, these  "U.S. Persons," when regarded as "foreign persons" under the Global Magnitsky Act, have additional sanctions exposure that would not apply to, for example, individuals holding only U.S. citizenship or companies organized only under U.S. law(s) and existing only in the United States.
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From Sergei Magnitsky to Global Magnitsky: United States Asserts Universal Jurisdiction Over Corruption and Human Rights Abuses

As the above description indicates, the Sergei Magnitsky Act targets persons and places tied to specific events that occurred in one country. Moreover, the Sergei Magnitsky Act can be read to have been adopted or operate as an alternative or last recourse for justice and accountability, following Congress’ findings that there was a denial of “any justice or legal remedies” to Mr. Magnitsky by “all state bodies of the Russian Federation” and “impunity since his death of state officials.” In contrast, the Global Magnitsky Act contains no analogous Congressional findings, nor does it expressly state or imply that it is a last or alternative resort where adequate legal processes to adjudicate corruption or human rights abuses are unavailable in foreign countries where relevant events took place or parties are located, or before foreign tribunals to which relevant states have submitted to jurisdiction. Instead, the Global Magnitsky Act’s default position is the applicability of U.S. sanctions (supported by “credible evidence”) without the requirement of a jurisdictional nexus with the United States. Accordingly, the Global Magnitsky Act asserts U.S. universal jurisdiction over the corrupt acts and human rights abuses it targets. EO 13818 goes much further.
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U.S. Magnitsky Sanctions Are a Powerful Weapon Against Corruption and Human Rights Abuse

EO 13818 directly targets foreign government officials and private parties who commit or enable human rights abuses and certain corrupt acts. The Order also employs extraordinary theories of liability. For example, EO 13818 holds current and former “leaders” of foreign entities (government and private) strictly and vicariously liable—and thus sanctionable—for the corrupt acts, during a leader’s tenure, of their entities. The Order also imputes the sanctioned status of a blocked private or government entity to its current or former “leaders,” if the entity was blocked “as a result of activities related to the leader’s or official’s tenure.” Additionally, EO 13818 treats as a corrupt act the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of corrupt proceeds by current or former foreign government officials and “persons acting for or on their behalf.” These three bases for liability, among others, are unique to EO 13818—they are not provided for by the Global Magnitsky Act.
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Iran Sanctions

Hostility Toward Iran Nuclear Deal May Have Chilling Effect on Legal Transactions Under U.S. Sanctions

The prospect of increasingly hostile policy and legal actions toward Iran may be enough to thwart or make more difficult Iran-related transactions that are (and might remain) legal. Parties planning to engage in such legal Iran-related transactions should take note and, if appropriate, action ahead of any changes in law or adjustments in Iran-related risk-assessments by banks and individual and commercial parties.
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Hdeel Abdelhady - Economic Sanctions, Emerging Technologies Exports, CFIUS

Hdeel Abdelhady Discussed Islamic Finance at Harvard Law School

MassPoint’s Founder and Principal, Hdeel Abdelhady, will speak at a program on Islamic Finance at Harvard Law School. Ms. Abdelhady, who has acted as legal counsel to financial institutions, companies, and non-profit organizations on Islamic Finance, banking, and governance matters, teaches a course in Transactional Islamic Law at The George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. The program, entitled “Islamic Finance: Principles and Strategies,” will take place on March 6, 2018 at the Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Program information is available via Harvard Law School.
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Ukraine/Russia Sanctions: Prohibited Debt and Equity Under OFAC Directives 1, 2 or 3

As discussed in an earlier MassPoint Business Update on OFAC Directive 1, it was expected that OFAC would issue, by November 28, 2017, a general license authorizing derivative transactions in prohibited debt and equity (see table below), consistent with the debt maturity limitations imposed by CAATSA. General License 1B does not authorize primary transactions by U.S. persons (wherever located) or in the United States in assets subject to the prohibitions of Directives 1, 2, or 3.
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MassPoint Named “Corporate Law Firm of the Year” USA in Finance Monthly Global Awards 2017

MassPoint Legal and Strategy Advisory PLLC (“MassPoint PLLC“), a boutique Washington. D.C. law and strategy firm, was named 2017 Finance Monthly’s Global Awards “Corporate Law Firm of the Year” for the United States.Finance Monthly is a “global publication delivering news, comment and analysis to those at the centre of the corporate sector.” “The Finance Monthly Global Awards recognise and commend financial organisations and advisors worldwide who have performed in the highest level possible and celebrate the success, innovation and quality of firms working in, and with, the financial and legal sectors across the globe.”
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Russia Sectoral Sanctions

OFAC DIRECTIVE 1 AS AMENDED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017

As required by the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA), the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on September 29, 2017 amended and reissued OFAC Directive 1 (Directive 1). As amended, Directive 1 continues to prohibit certain “new” debt, equity, and related transactions involving entities subject to U.S. Sectoral Sanctions targeting Russia’s financial services sector. This Business Update discusses the background to and mechanics of Directive 1 as amended and reissued.
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Banks, Credit Unions and Other Financial Insitutions as Deputized Law Enforcement

The logic and law enforcement value of imposing anti-financial crime obligations on financial intermediaries are clear. Nevertheless, a reassessment is now appropriate, particularly given (1) increasing legal and regulatory demands on financial intermediaries; (2) the exclusion, through “derisking,” from the financial system of small and medium businesses (SMEs), nonprofit organizations, money services businesses (MSBs), and correspondent relationship-dependent banks; and, (3) overarching questions as to whether the financial and administrative costs of compliance within the current legal framework—generally or at specific points—yield commensurate law enforcement benefits without unduly harming the legitimate interests of individuals, businesses and other financial system stakeholders.
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Dana Gas Sukuk Governing Law and Jurisdiction

This post discusses these issues in Dana Gas sukuk matter and offers some observations and lessons that can be drawn from the governing law and forum selection questions raised by the Dana Gas sukuk matter. As this post entails post hoc discussion of the Dana Gas sukuk offering based on publicly available information, there is an element (or more) of Monday morning quarterbacking, and this should be borne in mind. Nevertheless, the general observations and potential lessons—which are not unique to the Dana Gas sukuk or Islamic transactions—should be read for their generality.
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Dana Gas Deems its Own Sukuk Unlawful: Parsing the Dana Gas Statement

Dana Gas PJSC, the Sharjah, UAE-based gas producer, has unilaterally declared “unlawful” sukuk[2] instruments issued by the company in 2013 [3] (through, as issuer, Dana Gas Sukuk Limited, a Jersey public company with limited liability). This post discusses some of the Shari’ah, UAE law, and factual issues triggered by the Dana Gas statement on the unlawfulness of its sukuk.
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China’s One Belt One Road Could Disrupt U.S. Legal Dominance

The OBOR, even if partially successful, would, as many analysts and commentators have noted, alter the global trade landscape, if not “shake up” the global economic order in place since the end of World War II. Less discussed (except, for example, in this 2015 MassPoint Occasional Note) is one likely secondary effect of the OBOR and other trade and finance initiatives that are not centered on the U.S. dollar or the Bretton Woods system: the likely curtailment of the global reach of U.S. law.
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Congressional Hearing on Terrorism Financing Probes Bank Secrecy Act Data Effectiveness, Potential BSA Amendments

On April 27, 2017, I attended a Congressional hearing on “Safeguarding the Financial System from Terrorist Financing,” held by the House Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance (the “Subcommittee”). The sole witness was Mr. Jamal El-Hindi, Acting Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury charged with protecting the financial system from money laundering, terrorism financing and other illicit activities. The hearing’s purposes were to examine the methods and efficacy of FinCEN data collection, processing and information sharing and whether the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and USA PATRIOT Act should be amended to improve FinCEN’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) capacities and performance. In this brief MassPoint update, I highlight BSA data collection and usage numbers and some of the questions and issues that appeared to be of particular interest and/or concern to Congress members in attendance, taking into account the nature and frequency of the questions asked, the tone of questions, and related requests for additional or clarifying information from FinCEN.
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Hdeel Abdelhady Appointed ABA Liaison to Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (DIFC Courts)

Hdeel Abdelhady has been appointed to serve as the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of International Law’s Liaison to the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (DIFC Courts). Ms. Abdelhady, who is MassPoint’s Founder and Principal, has lived and worked in Dubai and previously worked in the DIFC and collaborated with DIFC entities. Ms. Abdelhady currently serves as a Co-Chair of the ABA Section of International Law’s Middle East Committee, which she has led for three years as a Co-Chair. She also serves on the Board of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative’s Middle East and North Africa Council and as the ABA Section of International Law’s Liaison to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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Do State Regulators Have Authority to Enforce OFAC Sanctions?

The enforcement of OFAC-administered sanctions by a state agency—even against banks by a banking regulator operating in a dual banking system—raises fundamental constitutional and other legal questions. Chief among them is the overarching question of whether U.S. states have authority to directly or effectively enforce OFAC-administered sanctions, particularly independently and prior to enforcement by competent federal authorities—namely OFAC. This question and some of the legal issues and policy and practical considerations appertaining to it are discussed in detail in a forthcoming publication. This document provides a summary preview of some of the key legal issues discussed in that publication. Additional summary previews may be provided separately.
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Non-Dollar Trade Could Curtail the Global Reach of U.S. Sanctions and Other Laws

American economic and financial heft facilitates the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law. For example, global transactions that are denominated in U.S. dollars and processed through the U.S. financial system “touch” the United States, come within its jurisdiction and create a jurisdictional nexus to foreign parties, property and events associated with those transactions.
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Compliance for Financial Institutions: Anticorruption – AML Nexus

Enforcement authorities in the US and Asia reportedly are investigating financial institutions for potentially corrupt employment and business relationships with family members of government officials. The investigations underscore policy links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering regimes where dealings with Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are involved. This article, published by Hdeel Abdelhady in Butterworths Journal of Banking and Financial Law, briefly discusses the pending investigations and the anti-corruption-AML policy nexus, and suggests, with respect to PEPs and more generally, that financial institutions facilitate fluidity in their compliance programs to allow for the sharing of information and adaptation of compliance protocols across (sometimes impermeable) internal functional and disciplinary lines.
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